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Abstract
Itiswellknownthatdelegating theplay ofagametoanagentviaincentive contractsmay serve
as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown
that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported
as a sequential equilibrium outcome of the induced delegation game when contracts are unob-
servable and non-renegotiable. Inthis paper wecharacterizeequilibrium outcomes of delegation
gameswithunobservableandincompletecontractswithandwithoutrenegotiationopportunities
undertheassumption thattheprincipalcannotobserveevery history inthegamewhenplayedby
her agent. We show that incompleteness of the contracts restricts the set of outcomes to a subset
of Nash equilibrium outcomes and renegotiation imposes further constraints. Yet, there is a large
class of games in which non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the principals-only game
can be supported even with renegotiable contracts, and hence delegation still has a bite.
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11 Introduction
The main idea behind strategic delegation is that contracts with third parties may serve as a com-
mitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage (Schelling (1960)). Under the assumption
of observable contracts, previous literature has illustrated this possibility in many settings.1 If con-
tracts are unobservable, however, Katz (1991) showed that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game
without delegation and those of the same game played between agents are identical. However, if the
goal is to understand the role of delegation in an extensive form game, it is more appropriateto com-
pare the set of equilibrium outcomes, with and without delegation, when some form of sequential
rationality is imposed.
Recently, KoçkesenandOk(2004)andKoçkesen (2007)addressedthisquestionwithinthecontext
of ﬁnite two-person extensive form (principals-only) games. They showed that anyNash equilibrium
outcome of the principals-only game in which the principals receive more than their individually
rational (minmax) payoffs can be supported as a sequential equilibrium outcome of the delegation
game.
Delegation with unobservable contracts yields equilibrium outcomes that differ from the sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game by making the agent behave in a se-
quentially irrational manner, from the perspective of the principal, at certain points in the game.
These points in the game must be off the equilibrium path since otherwise the principal-agent pair
could increase the total surplus available to them by inducing the agent to act sequentially rational.
Therefore, if the game ever reaches such a point, the principal and the agent will have an incentive to
renegotiate theexisting contract andwrite a new one thatmakestheagent act sequentially rationally.
This implies that if contracts can be renegotiated without any friction at any point in the game, then
the agent must play sequentially rationally from the perspective of the principal at every point in the
game. Thus, delegation underrenegotiablecontractscannotyield anyequilibrium outcome different
from the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game.
Therefore, the question becomes interesting only when there are frictions in the renegotiation
process. In this paper we analyze an environment in which such a friction arises quite naturally: we
assume that the principal cannot observe every history in the game, and hence can contract only on
a partition of the set of outcomes. In this case, after certain histories, there may arise a disagreement
between the agent and the principal regarding what is a Pareto improving contract. If, furthermore,
the agent cannot credibly signal the existence of such Pareto improving opportunities, his renegotia-
tion attempt may fail. Motivated by this observation we ask and answer the following question in the
current paper: Which outcomes can be supported in a delegation game with renegotiable contracts if
the principal cannot observe every historyof the original game when it is played by her agent?
We limit our analysis to ﬁnite two-stage principals-only games, in which player 1 moves ﬁrst by
choosing an action a1 ∈ A1, and afterobserving a1, player 2 chooses anaction a2 ∈ A2. In the induced
delegation game, player 2 (the principal) offers a contract f : A2 → R to her agent, which speciﬁes a
transferfrom the agent to the principalas a function of the agent’s action. In essence, we assume that
the principal cannot observe a1 and hence contracts are incomplete in the sense that they specify a
transferasafunctionof a2,ratherthan(a1,a2). Thecontractisunobservabletoplayer1, whochooses
1See Fershtman and Judd (1987), Gatsios and Karp (1991), and Persson and Tabellini (1993), among others, for various
applications. Fershtman et al. (1991), Polo and Tedeschi (2000), and Katz (2006) prove different “folk theorems” for some
classes of delegation games under observable and non-renegotiablecontracts.
2anaction a1, afterwhich the agentdecides whetherto end the game by choosing anaction a2 or offer
a new contract g to the principal. The principal has to decide whether to accept g or not, without
being informed about a1. Our objective is to characterize the set of outcomes of the principals-only
game that can be supported in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the induced delegation game.
Therefore, in our setting, where theonly friction in therenegotiation process is the inability of the
principal to observe every history, contract incompleteness is a necessary condition for supporting
outcomes that are not subgame perfectequilibrium outcomes of the principals-only game. However,
contractincompletenessitself bringsaboutinterestingissuesthatareindependentoftheexistenceof
renegotiation opportunities. Supportingan outcome in a PBE of thedelegation game dependson the
ability of writing a contract that gives proper incentives to the agent to play certain strategies. When
contracts are complete, as in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007), ﬁnding such contracts is
relatively easy, as incentive compatibility does not arise as a binding constraint. When contracts are
incomplete, however, only incentive compatible strategies of theagent canbe supported. We analyze
thisquestion insection 4.1andshow that,ifpayoff functionsexhibitincreasing differences, thenonly
the Nash equilibria of the principals-only game in which the agent plays an increasing strategy can
be supported.
As we show in section 4.2, renegotiation imposes further constraints on outcomes that can be
supported. In that section, we completely characterize contract-strategy pairs that are renegotiation
proofandgivenecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionsforastrategyoftheagenttoberenegotiationproof.
In section 5 we apply our results to an environment that is common to many economically relevant
games, such astheStackelbergandultimatumbargaininggames, andcompletely characterizetheset
of outcomes that can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Previousliteraturehasidentiﬁed two scenarios, which arecomplementarytoours, inwhich rene-
gotiable contracts mayhave a commitment value: (1) games in which there is exogenous asymmetric
informationbetween the principaland the agent (Dewatripont (1988) and Caillaud et al. (1995)); and
(2) two-stage games with nontransferable utilities (Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993)).
Dewatripont (1988) analyzes an entry-deterrence game in which the incumbent signs a contract
with the union before the game begins. This contract is observable by the potential entrant, who
chooses whether to enter or not. Renegotiation takes place after the entry decision is made, during
which the union offers a new contract to the incumbent, who has by this time received a payoff rel-
evant private information. He shows that commitment effects exist in such a model and may deter
entry. This is similar to our model in that the principals-only game is a two-stage game and renego-
tiation happens after the outside party chooses his action. However, in his model the friction in the
renegotiation process arises from an exogenously given asymmetric information, whereas in ours it
comes from the inability of the principal to observe the outside party’s move. Furthermore, unlike
Dewatripont, we analyze arbitrary two-stage games, which enables us to identify conditions on the
supportable outcomes in terms of the primitives of the principals-only game.
In Caillaud et al. (1995), unlike in our model, the principals-only game is a simultaneous move
game. The delegation game begins by the principal offering a publicly observable contract, which
may be renegotiated secretly afterwards. After the renegotiation stage, the agent receives a payoff
relevant information,afterwhich he maydecide to quit. If hedoes not quit, theagent andthe outside
party(which isanotherprincipal-agentpair)simultaneously choose theiractionsandthegameends.
Their main question is whether publicly announced contracts, which may be secretly renegotiated
3afterwards, can have a commitment value. They show that the answer to this question depends on
whethertheprincipals-only game exhibitsstrategic complementarityor substitutability andwhether
there are positive or negative externalities.
Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993) also analyze a model in which the principals-only game is a two-
stage game and the initial contract can be renegotiated after player 1 chooses an action. However, in
theirmodelplayer 1’s action is contractible andobservable, but utilityis nottransferablebetween the
principaland the agent. They show that, in a certain class of games, contracts with third parties hasa
commitment effect, even when they are renegotiable.
In the next section we provide two simple games, one of which illustrates that non-subgame per-
fect outcomes can be supported while the other one shows that this is not true in general. Therefore,
characterization of PBE outcomes that can supported with renegotiable contracts is an interesting
and, as we will show, non-trivial matter. Sections 4 and 5 deal with this question in general two-stage
principals-onlygamesandSection6doesthesameusingintuitivecriterion(ChoandKreps(1987)) as
the equilibrium concept. Section 7 concludes with some remarks and open questions, while section
8 contains the proofs of our results.
2 Examples and Motivation
Inthissection we analyzetwo simple games, anultimatumbargainingandasequentialbattle-of-the-
sexesgame, each of which hasa unique subgame perfectequilibrium. We will show that renegotiable
contracts can support a Nash equilibrium outcome that is not perfect in the bargaining game, while
only the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome can be supported in the battle-of-the-sexes game.
ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
Consider a simple ultimatum bargaining game in which player 1 moves ﬁrst, by choosing the
action L or R, after which player 2 moves by choosing l or r. The payoffs corresponding to each
outcome is given in the game tree in Figure 1, where the ﬁrst number is player 1’s payoff and the
second number player 2’s.
1
2 2
0,0 2,1 0,0 1,2
L R
l r l r
Figure 1: Ultimatum Bargaining Game
Intheuniquesubgameperfectequilibrium (SPE)ofthisgameplayer 2chooses r aftereachaction
and player 1 chooses L. There is another Nash equilibrium of this game in which player 2 chooses l
afterL, and r afterR, while player 1plays R. ThisNash equilibrium givesplayer 2 ahigher payoffthan
does the subgame perfectequilibrium, and hence if she could commit to such a strategy in a credible
way she would want to do so.
4Now consider the following delegation game. Player 2 offers a contract to a neutral agent whose
outside option is δ≥0. A contract speciﬁes a transferbetween player 2 andthe agent, asa function of
the contractible outcomes of the game. If the agent accepts the contract, player 1 and the agent play
the game, otherwise players 1 and 2 play the game and the agent receives his outside option. Let us
assume that δ is small enough so that the cost delegation is low. The set of perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium outcomes of the delegation game differs depending upon the characteristics of the contracts.
If contractsareobservable, non-renegotiable, andcomplete, in thesense thatthetransferscanbe
madeconditionalontheentiresetofoutcomes, thentheuniquePBEoutcomeofthedelegationgame
is(R,r). Acontractthatpaystheagenthisoutsideoptioniftheoutcome is(L,l)or(R,r)andpayszero
otherwise is a possible equilibrium contract that achieves this outcome. This is nothing but another
illustration of the commitment value of observable, non-renegotiable, and complete contracts.
If contracts are unobservable, then the SPE outcome of the original game, i.e., (L,r), is also an
equilibriumoutcomeofthegame, inadditionto(R,r). Thisisanexampleillustratingthemainresults
in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) which state that all Nash equilibrium outcomes can
be supported with unobservable (but complete and non-renegotiable) contracts.
If contracts can be renegotiated after the game begins, but they are complete, then the unique
equilibrium outcome of the delegation game is the SPE outcome of the original game, irrespective
of whether contracts are observable or unobservable. The reason is simple: The only way a non-SPE
outcome can be supported is through the agent playing l after player 1 plays L, which is sequentially
irrational from the perspective of player 2’s preferences in the principals-only game. Therefore, if
player 1 plays L, player 2 and the agent have an incentive to renegotiate the contract so that under
the new contract the agent plays r. In other words, in any PBE, the agent must play r after any action
choice of player 1, and hence player 1 must play L.
The conclusion is entirelydifferent if player 2 can observe heragent’s action but not thatof player
1. This implies that feasible contracts are incomplete, i.e., they can specify transfers conditional on
only the agent’s actions but not player 1’s actions. We will show that the non-SPE outcome (R,r) is an
equilibrium outcome of the delegation game even if contracts can be renegotiated.2 To this end let
us specify the renegotiation process as an explicit game form: after player 1 plays, the agent decides
whether to renegotiate, by offering a new contract to player 2, or not, in which case he chooses an
action and the game ends. If he offers a new contract, then player 2 either accepts or rejects it, after
which the agent chooses an action and the game ends. If the new contract offer is accepted by player
2,thenthepayoffsaredeterminedaccordingtothenewcontractwhileifrejectedtheyaredetermined
according to the old contract. The crucial assumption is that the principal cannot observe player 1’s
action at any time.
For the simplicity of exposition assume that δ = 0. Then, the following is a PBE of this game.
Player 2 offers the contract that transfers 2 from the agent to the principal if the agent plays r, and
transfers 0.5 if the agent plays l. The agent accepts any contract that gives him an expected payoff of
at least zero; player 1’s beliefs put probability 1 on this contract and she plays R; the agent chooses
not to renegotiate and plays l following L and r following R. In the event of an out-of-equilibrium
renegotiation offer by the agent, player 2 believes that player 1 has played R and rejects any contract
that transfers him less than 2.
2This has been ﬁrst shown by Katz (1991) for the ultimatum bargaining game, which provided the initial motivation for
this research.
5SEQUENTIAL BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES
Consider now the sequential battle-of-the-sexesgame given in Figure 2. This game is verysimilar
to the ultimatum bargaining game analyzed above. It has a unique SPE in which player 2 plays l after
L and r after R while player 1 plays L. There is another Nash equilibrium in which player 2 plays r
afterbothactionsandplayer1playsR. Itcanbeshown easilythattheuniqueequilibrium outcomeof
theinduceddelegationgameis(R,r)ifthecontractsareobservable, non-renegotiable, andcomplete,
whereas the SPE outcome (L,l) can also be supported if contracts are unobservable. If contracts are
complete and renegotiable, then only the SPE outcome can be supported. All these observations are
in line with those made for the ultimatum bargaining game.
1
2 2
2,1 0,0 0,0 1,2
L R
l r l r
Figure 2: Battle-of-the-Sexes Game
However, the conclusion differs drastically from that in the ultimatum bargaining example if we
assume that contracts are renegotiable and incomplete. In this game only the SPE outcome can be
supported, while in ultimatum bargaining non-SPE outcomes could also be supported. Let us prove
that the Nash equilibrium outcome (R,r) cannot be supported by renegotiable contracts. Suppose,
for contradiction, that there exists a PBE of the delegation game that supports this outcome. Let
f : {l,r} → R be the equilibrium contract that speciﬁes the transfer to be made from the agent to
player 2. For this outcome to be supported, the agent must be playing r after both actions and hence
the following incentive compatibility constraints must be satisﬁed.
0− f (r)≥1− f (l)
2− f (r)≥0− f (l)
Also, in equilibrium, player 2 must be extracting all the surplus from the agent, and hence f (r) =
2. Together with incentive compatibility conditions we therefore have f (l) ≥ 3. Now consider the
renegotiation offer by the agent g(l) = g(r) = 2.5 after player 1 plays L. Note that player 2 does not
knowwhichactionhasbeenplayedbyplayer1whenfacedwiththisrenegotiationoffer. Ifsheaccepts
g she will receive a payoff of 2.5 irrespective of player 1’s action. If, on the other hand, she rejects
it, she believes that the agent will play r after any action by player 1 and hence she will receive a
payoffof 2. Therefore, whateverherbeliefsare, shehasanincentive to accept thisrenegotiation offer.
Furthermore,the agent has an incentive to make such an offer afterplayer 1 plays L since under f his
expected payoff is −2, whereas under g his expected payoff is −1.5. This establishes that there is no
PBE that supports the outcome (R,r) with renegotiable contracts. Indeed, the unique outcome that
can be supported in this case is the SPE outcome of the original game, i.e., (L,l).
In this section we presented two games that are superﬁcially similar, for which delegation with
6renegotiable contracts gives completely different results. In the rest of the paper we will provide an
answer to why this is the case and characterize outcomes that can be supported with renegotiable
contracts in arbitrarytwo-stage extensive form games.
3 The Model
3.1 Preliminaries
An extensive form game with perfect recall is a collection Υ=[N,H,P,(Ii,ui)i∈N], where N denotes a
ﬁnite set of players and H stands for a set of sequences interpreted as the set of histories. The initial
historyis denoted ;and we assume thatforanyinteger k ≥1, (a1,...,ak)∈ H whenever(a1,...,ak+1)∈
H. An history h is said to be terminal if it is inﬁnite or (h,a) ∉ H for any a and the set of all terminal
histories (also called outcomes) is denoted Z. The function ui : Z →R is the payoff function of player
i, and the function P : H\Z → N is the player function. If P(h) = i, we understand that i moves
immediately after history h and chooses an action from the set A(h) ≡ {a : (h,a)∈ H}. For each i, Ii
is a partition of H(i)≡{h ∈ H :P(h)=i} such that A(h)= A(h0) whenever h,h0 ∈ I ∈Ii. Consequently,
without ambiguity, we may write A(I) (P(I), resp.) instead of A(h) (P(h), resp.) for any h ∈ I. Any
member of Ii is called an information set for player i. If all information sets in Υ are singletons, we
say that this game is with perfect information, and omit information partitions in its deﬁnition. The
subgames of Υ are deﬁned in the usual way.
Abehaviorstrategyforplayeri isdeﬁnedasasetofindependentprobabilitymeasuresβi ≡{βi[I]:
I ∈Ii}whereβi[I]isdeﬁnedon A(I). Onemaywriteβi[h]forβi[I]foranyh ∈ I withtheunderstand-
ingthatforanyh andh0 thatbelongtothesameinformationset,wehaveβi[h]=βi[h0]. Ifβi[I](a)=1
for some a ∈ A(I) for all I, we call it a pure (behavior) strategy and write βi[I] = a. The set of all be-
havior strategies of player i is denoted Bi(Υ), whereas B(Υ) ≡ ×i∈NBi(Υ) is the set of all behavior
strategy proﬁles. We denote the set of all Nash and subgameperfect equilibria of Υ in behavior strate-
gies by NE(Υ) and SPE(Υ), respectively.
By a system of beliefs, we mean a set µ ≡ {µ[I] : I ∈ Ii for some i}, where µ[I] is a probability
measure on I. We denote the set of all systems of beliefs by M(Υ). A 2-tuple (β,µ)∈ B(Υ)×M(Υ) is
calledanassessment. Anassessment (β,µ)issaid tobeaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)if(1)each
player’s strategy is optimal at every information set given her beliefs and the other players’ strategies;
and (2) beliefs at every information set are consistent with observed histories and strategies.3 We
denote the set of all such assessments as PBE(Υ).
3.2 DelegationEnvironments
Ourobjective isto startwith atwo-player game, called theprincipals-onlygame, andcharacterize the
set of equilibrium outcomes of the delegation game induced by it. Delegation takes place by one of
the players (the principal) of the principals-only game delegating the play of the game to an agent.
The agent acts under a contract that maps a partition of the set of outcomes into monetary transfers
betweentheprincipalandtheagent. Weareparticularyinterested inwhethertheinduceddelegation
game has equilibrium outcomes that are not equilibrium outcomes in the principals-only game, i.e.,
whether delegation “matters”.
3See Fudenberg and Tirole(1991) for a precise deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
7As we will see in the sequel, the nature of the contract space and whether we allow for renego-
tiation of the contracts during the play of the game is crucial in our query. Previous literature has
analyzed this question under the assumption of complete and non-renegotiable contracts, which
may be observable or unobservable by third parties. Our focus, in contrast, is on contracts that can
be renegotiated at anypoint in a costless and secret manner. This immediately implies that contracts
areunobservable, sincetheycanberenegotiatedbeforetheagentstartstoplay. Ifwealsoassumethat
contracts are complete, i.e., the contract space is the set of all functions f : Z → R, and there are no
frictionsin the renegotiation process, such asasymmetric informationbetween theprincipaland the
agent, delegation cannot “alter” the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game. Therefore, one
has to introduce some sort of friction into the renegotiation process to make the analysis interesting.
As we mentioned before, previous literature has analyzed two particular forms of frictions in the
renegotiation process: (1) exogenous asymmetric information between the principal and the agent
and (2) nontransferable utilities.
We analyze a model in which the friction arises from the assumption that the principal cannot
observe all the histories of the principals-only game when it is played by her agent. We believe that
this is a natural environment to consider, for otherwise we would have to assume that the principal
constantlyandperfectlymonitorstheplayofthegame, includingtheactionsoftheplayersotherthan
heragent. In anycase, we think thatthe resulting model is quite rich and introduces new dimensions
into theanalysis of contractsin strategicsettings, such ascontract incompleteness andmoral hazard.
The assumption that the principal cannot observe every history in the game implies that mone-
tarytransferscannot be conditioned on everyterminalhistoryof the game andhence contracts must
be incomplete. Furthermore, if the principal cannot observe some of her agent’s actions, then moral
hazard becomes an issue in contract design. In this paper we assume that the principal can observe
all of her agent’s actions and focus on incompleteness, leaving the analysis of issues associated with
moral hazard for future work.
Contract incompleteness in our setting, therefore, is a necessary condition for obtaining non-
trivial results regarding the effects of renegotiation in delegation. However, incompleteness intro-
duces novel issues into the analysis and is interesting in itself. The set of equilibrium outcomes that
can be attained in a delegation game depends on the ability of the contracts to give the agent in-
centives to play certain actions. Incentive compatibility is satisﬁed in a trivial way in models with
complete contracts (such as the one in Koçkesen and Ok (2004)). However, as we will see later on,
incentive compatibility becomes a binding constraint in a model with incomplete contracts and ob-
taining sharp results requires imposing further structure on the model, such as assuming that payoff
functions exhibit increasing differences.
It is easiest to prove and understand our results in a particularly simple model in which the
principals-only game has only two stages: Player 1 moves ﬁrst and player 2 second. Limiting player
1’s move to only the ﬁrst stage makes formulating the model, e.g., introducing an order structure on
the set of histories in the game and deﬁning increasing differences, much easier and renders the re-
sults more transparent. Since the main intuition behind our results is best seen in this simple model,
we conduct the entire analysis for two-stage games.
Limiting the analysis to two-stage games simpliﬁes the analysis further as we may, without loss
of generality, assume that only the second mover has the option to delegate. Delegation introduces
equilibrium outcomes that are not equilibrium outcomes in the principals-only game by making the
8agent play in a sequentially irrational manner (from the perspective of the principal’s preferences
in the principals-only game) at information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. Since, when
contracts are unobservable, the ﬁrst mover has only one information set, which is reached in every
equilibrium, allowing him to delegate would not change the set of equilibrium outcomes at all.4
In light of these observations, we deﬁne the principals-only game as a two-player ﬁnite extensive
form game with perfect information:
G =({1,2},H,P,(u1,u2))
We assume that this game is composed of two stages: Player 1 chooses a1 ∈ A1, and player 2, after
observing a1, chooses a2 ∈ A2, where A1 and A2 are ﬁnite sets. Therefore H = {;}∪ A1 ∪ A1× A2 and
P(;)=1, P(a1)=2, for all a1 ∈ A1. Payofffunctionofplayeri isgivenbyui : A →R, where A = A1×A2.
The delegation game withincomplete and non-renegotiablecontracts Γ(G) is a three player exten-
sive form game described by the following sequence of events:
StageI. Player 2, whom we sometimes call the principal, offers a contract f : A2 →R to the agent. In
other words, we assume that the contract space is given by C =RA2.
StageII. The agent accepts (denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the contract.
1. In case of rejection the game ends, the agent receives his outside option which we nor-
malize to be zero, and player 1 and 2 receive −∞.5
2. If the agent accepts, the game goes to Stage III.
StageIII. Player 1choosesanaction a1 ∈ A1 (withoutobservingthecontract),andtheagentobserves
a1.
StageIV. The agent chooses an action a2 ∈ A2.
More precisely
Γ(G)=[N,H,P,(Ii,vi)i∈N].
The set of players is N ={1,2,3}, where player 3 is the agent. The set of histories is given by
H ={;}∪C ∪C ×{y,n}∪C ×{y}× A1∪C ×{y}× A1× A2
whereas the set of outcomes is
Z =C ×{n}∪C ×{y}× A1× A2.
The player function is deﬁned by
P(;)=2,P(f )=3,P(f ,y)=1,P(f ,y,a1)=3, for all f ∈C and a1 ∈ A1.
All information sets are singletons except those of player 1, whose information partition is given by
I1 ={C }.
4Of course, as it was shown in Koçkesen (2007), in games with more than two stages this is not the case.
5Alternatively, we could assume that if the agent rejects an offer, then the principal plays the game. However, this as-
sumption introducesadditional notationand technical details withoutchanging any of the results in any substantiveway.
9Since we assume thatifthecontract offeris rejected bytheagentthegame endsandplayers 1and
2 receive very small payoffs, the contract offer is accepted in all equilibria. Therefore, we will, for the





















Thiscompletes thedeﬁnition of thedelegationgame withincompleteand non-renegotiablecontracts.
The delegation game is with renegotiable contracts if the agent and the principal can renegotiate
the contract after Stage III and before Stage IV. We assume that renegotiation can be initiated only
by the agent. However, as it will become apparent after we introduce our concept of renegotiation-
proofness, the results remain intact if the renegotiation process is initiated by player 2. The following





StageIII(i). The agent either offers a (renegotiation) contract g ∈ C to the principal or chooses an





StageIII(ii). If the agent offers a contract, the principal (without observing a1) either accepts (de-
noted y) or rejects (denoted n) the offer.
If the principal rejects the renegotiation offer g, then the agent chooses a2 ∈ A2 and the outcome









. All the information sets are singletons except that of player 1, whose information
partition is given by I1 = {C }, and those of player 2 following a renegotiation offer by the agent. Let





This completes the description of the delegation game with incomplete and renegotiable contracts,
which we denote as ΓR(G).
3.3 The Query
We will limit our analysis to pure behavioral strategies since considering mixed strategies does not
add anything in substance but brings additional notational and technical complexity to our presen-




Fix a behavior strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) ∈ A1 × A
A1
2 in G. We say that a pure strategy assessment
(β,µ) in Γ(G) induces (b1,b2) if β1[I1] = b1 and β3[β2[;],a1] = b2(a1), for any a1 ∈ A1. In ΓR(G),
the agent may choose an action a2 ∈ A2 either without renegotiating the initial contract β2[;], i.e.,
β3[β2[;],a1]∈ A2 forall a1 ∈ A1,orafterattemptingrenegotiation, i.e., β3[β2[;],a1]∈C forsome a1 ∈
A1. Accordingly, we say that a pure strategy assessment (β,µ) in ΓR(G) induces a behavior strategy
10proﬁle (b1,b2)∈ A1× A
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β3[β2[;],a1], if β3[β2[;],a1]∈ A2
β3[β2[;],a1,β3[β2[;],a1],β2[I2(β2[;],β3[β2[;],a1])]], if β3[β2[;],a1]∈C
for all a1 ∈ A1.
We restrict our attention to equilibria in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated. As
Beaudryand Poitevin (1995) point out, this is necessary for renegotiation to have anybite, as one can
always replicate an equilibrium outcome of the game without renegotiation by making the principal
offeraninitial contract thatis accepted only because it is going to be renegotiated later on. This leads
to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Renegotiation Proof Equilibria). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (β∗,µ∗) of ΓR(G) is
renegotiation proof if β∗
3[β∗
2[;],a1] ∈ A2 for all a1 ∈ A1, i.e., if the equilibrium contract β∗
2[;] is not
renegotiated after any choice of player 1.
Note that the set of renegotiation proof equilibria is actually a subset of perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated. The latter would be deﬁned so that the
equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any action of player 1 that gives her a higher payoff un-
dera renegotiatedcontract thantheequilibrium payoff. However, workingwith this weakernotion of
renegotiation proofness would only introduce additional complexity into our presentation without
changing the main results in an interesting way.
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) of the principals-only game G can be supported with incom-
pleteandnon-renegotiablecontractsifthereexistsaperfectBayesian equilibriumofΓ(G)thatinduces
(b1,b2).
Similarly, a strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) of the principals-only game G can be supported with incom-
plete and renegotiable contracts if there exists a renegotiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
ΓR(G) that induces (b1,b2).
Our main query can therefore be phrased as follows:
Which outcomes of a given principals-only game can be supported with incomplete and
renegotiable(or non-renegotiable)contracts?
Clearly, if an outcome can be supported with renegotiable contracts, it can also be supported with
non-renegotiablecontracts. Therefore,westartbycharacterizingthesetofoutcomesthatcanbesup-
ported with non-renegotiable contracts before we analyze the restrictions imposed by renegotiation.
We should emphasize that Γ(G) is a delegation game with unobservable but incomplete contracts.
The results provided in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) are valid only for delegation games with complete
contractsandhence do not provide the relevant startingpoint for our analysis. Applied to oursetting,
Koçkesen and Ok (2004) implies that every Nash equilibrium outcome can be supported with com-
plete contracts whereas, as we will see in the next section, only a subset of these can be supported
when the contracts are incomplete.
114 Main Results
In this section we will provide an answer to our main query for two-stage principals-only games, ﬁrst
for incomplete and non-renegotiable contracts and then for renegotiable contracts.
4.1 Incomplete and non-Renegotiable Contracts
Let G be an arbitrary principals-only game and Γ(G) be the delegation game with incomplete and
non-renegotiable contracts. We ﬁrst prove the following.
Proposition 1. A strategyproﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) ofG can be supportedwith incomplete and non-renegotiable
contractsif and only if
1. (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG













1)), for all a1,a0
1 ∈ A1.
Proposition1providesnecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionsforanoutcomeofanarbitraryprincipals-
only game to be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable contracts. Condition 1 states that
only Nash equilibrium outcomes can be supported, which is in line with Koçkesen and Ok (2004).
Condition 2 simply states that the agent does not receive rents in equilibrium, whereas condition 3 is
the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by the incompleteness of contracts.
Although Proposition 1 provides a complete characterization, it falls short of precisely identifying
the supportable outcomes in terms of the primitives of the principals-only game. As it is standard
in adverse selection models, we can obtain a much sharper characterization if we impose an order
structure on A1 and A2 and assume that the agent’s payoff function exhibits increasing differences.
Given the deﬁnition of the payoff function of the agent, this is equivalent to assuming that u2 has
increasing differences. To this end, let %1 be a linear order on A1 and %2 a linear order on A2, and
denote their asymmetric partsby Â1 and Â2, respectively.
Deﬁnition3(Increasing Differences). u2 : A1×A2 →Rissaidtohaveincreasingdifferencesin(%1,%2)
if a1 %1 a0
1 and a2 %2 a0




2). It is said to have
strictly increasing differences if a1 Â1 a0
1 and a2 Â2 a0










Fromnow on, we restrictouranalysisto principals-onlygamesin whichthereexistsalinearorder
%1 on A1 and a linear order %2 on A2 such that u2 has strictly increasing differences in (%1,%2). We
have the following result.
Theorem 1. A strategy proﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) of G can be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable
contractsif and only if (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG and b∗
2 is increasing.
12This result completely characterizes the strategy proﬁles that can be supported with incomplete
contracts and precisely identiﬁes the restrictions imposed by incompleteness. While earlier papers
showedthatanyNashequilibriumoftheprincipals-onlygamecanbesupportedinadelegationgame
with unobservable and complete contracts, this result shows that only the subset of Nash equilibria
in which the second player plays an increasing strategy can be supported if, instead, contracts are
incomplete.
The reason why only increasing strategies of the second player can be supportedis verysimilar to
thereason why only increasing strategies of theagent can be supported in standardadverse selection
models: If the payoff function of the agent exhibits increasing differences, then incentive compatibil-
ity is equivalent to increasing strategies. The set of actions of player 1, A1, plays the role of the type
set of the agent in standard models. The fact that contracts cannot be conditioned on A1 transforms
themodelintoanadverseselection model, which, combined withincreasing differencesexhibitedby
u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), necessitates increasing strategies to satisfy incentive compatibility, i.e., condition 3
of Proposition 1. We prove sufﬁciency by using a theorem of the alternative.
Aswe notedbefore, ifcontractsarerenegotiableandcomplete, thentheonlyequilibriumthatcan
be supported is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the principals-only game. Therefore, for renego-
tiable contracts to have any effect on the outcome of the game, they must be incomplete. However,
as we have just seen, contract incompleteness also acts as a restriction on the set of supportable
outcomes. Therefore, our query to identify outcomes that can be supported with renegotiable and
incomplete contracts is an interesting and a non-trivial one. The next section attacks precisely this
problem.
4.2 Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts
Let G be an arbitrary principals-only game and ΓR(G) be the delegation game with incomplete and
renegotiable contracts. As stated before we would like to identify the set of outcomes ofG thatcan be
supported by renegotiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibria of ΓR(G).
Whenfaced with a renegotiation offer, player 2has to formbeliefs regarding how the agent would
play under the new contract and compare her payoffs from the old and the new contracts to decide
whethertoacceptitornot. Aswehaveseeninsection4.1,contractincompletenessimposesincentive
compatibility constraints on the strategy of the agent, and therefore player 2has to restrict herbeliefs
to strategies that are incentive compatible under the new contract. For future reference, let us ﬁrst
deﬁne incentive compatibility as a property of any contract-strategy pair (f ,bf )∈C × A
A1
2 .
Deﬁnition 5 (Incentive Compatibility). (f ,bf )∈C × A
A1
2 is incentivecompatible if
u2(a1,bf (a1))− f (bf (a1))≥u2(a1,bf (a0
1))− f (bf (a0
1)) for all a1,a0
1 ∈ A1.
Tounderstandtheconstraintsimposedbyrenegotiationproofnesssupposethat(β,µ)isarenego-
tiation proof PBE of ΓR(G) and deﬁne f =β2[;], b2,f (a1)=β3[f ,a1] for all a1 ∈ A1. Now suppose that
foraparticularchoice of action byplayer 1, say a0









1))and g(b2,g(a1))> f (b2,f (a1))
for all a1 ∈ A1. This implies that, after a0
1 is played, the agent will have an incentive to renegotiate and
offer g and the principal will have an incentive to accept it. This would contradict that (β,µ) is a
renegotiation proof PBE of ΓR(G). This leads to the following deﬁnition.
13Deﬁnition 6 (Renegotiation Proofness). We say that (f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 is renegotiationproof if for all
a1 ∈ A1 for which there exists an incentive compatible (g,b2,g)∈C × A
A1
2 such that
u2(a1,b2,g(a1))−g(b2,g(a1))>u2(a1,b2,f (a1))− f (b2,f (a1)) (1)
and
g(b2,g(a1))> f (b2,f (a1)) (2)
there exists an a0




Again, the intuition behind this deﬁnition is clear: Whenever there is an agent (i.e., a1) for whom
there is a contract, g, and an incentive compatible continuation play b2,g such that both the agent
and the principal prefer g over f (i.e., (1) and (2) hold), there exists a belief of the principal under
which it is optimal to reject g, which is implied by (3).6


































≤ f (b2,f (ak
1))− f (b2,f (ai
1))
(4)























Let us illustrate the proof of the sufﬁciency part of the theorem when A1 = {a1
1,a2
1} and b2,f (a1
1)∈
argmaxa2 u2(a1
1,a2). Suppose that there exists an incentive compatible (g,b2,g) ∈ C × A
A1
2 such that
(1) and (2) hold for a2















1))+ f (b2,f (a2
1)). (6)









so that (3) is satisﬁed and we conclude that (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof. The proof of the theorem
forthegeneralcase uses atheorem ofthealternativetoshow thatthecondition statedin thetheorem
is necessary and sufﬁcient.
6One may ﬁnd this deﬁnition too weak as it allows the beliefs to be arbitrary following an off-the-equilibrium renegoti-
ation offer. A more reasonable alternative could be to require the beliefs to satisfy intuitivecriterion. In Section 6 we show
that our results go throughwith minor modiﬁcations when we adopt this strongerversion of renegotiationproofness.
14In order to apply this theorem directly to a given game and a strategy b2 one would ﬁrst identify
the set of contracts under which the agent has an incentive to play b2, and then check if any of those
contracts satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem. It is best to illustrate this using the examples in-
troduced in Section 2. For both the ultimatum bargaining and sequential battle-of-the-sexes games,
deﬁne %1 and %2 so that R Â1 L and r Â2 l and note that u2 has strictly increasing differences in
(%1,%2).
ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
There are three Nash equilibria of the game (L,rl), (L,rr), and (R,lr), where, for example, (L,rl)
denotes the strategy proﬁle in which player 1 plays L and player 2 plays r after L and l after R. The
second one is the unique SPE and it has the same outcome as the ﬁrst. The third one is not sub-
game perfect. Notice that the last two equilibria have increasing b2 and hence, by Theorem 1, can
be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable contracts. Since the SPE can be supported with
renegotiable contracts as well, the question is whether (R,lr) can be supported with incomplete and
renegotiable contracts.7
Any equilibrium contract f that supports (R,lr) must satisfy the incentive compatibility con-
straint given by 1 ≤ f (r)− f (l) ≤ 2. Since agent R is already best responding, the only candidate
for renegotiation is agent L and we must have b2,g(L) = r. Incentive compatibility implies that b2,g
is non-decreasing, and therefore, b2,g(R) = r. From Theorem 2, (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof if and
only if
[u2(L,b2,g(L))−u2(L,b2,f (L))]+[u2(R,b2,g(R))−u2(R,b2,g(L))]≤ f (b2,f (R))− f (b2,f (L))
Substituting for b2,f and b2,g, this is equivalent to 1≤ f (r)− f (l). Since incentive compatibility holds
if 1≤ f (r)− f (l)≤2, we conclude that b2,f =lr can be supported with a renegotiation proof contract
and hence (R,lr)can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
SEQUENTIAL BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES
There are three Nash equilibria of the game: (L,ll), (L,lr), and (R,rr). The second one is the
uniqueSPE andithasthesameoutcome astheﬁrst. Thethirdoneisnotsubgame perfect. Allofthese
equilibria have an increasing b2 and hence can be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable
contracts. The question again is whether the (non-subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium (R,rr) can be
supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Firstnotethatincentivecompatibilityimplies f (l)−f (r)≥1. Theonlycandidateforrenegotiation
is agent L and we must have b2,g(L)=l. Theorem 2 implies that if (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof then
[u2(L,b2,g(L))−u2(L,b2,f (L))]+[u2(R,b2,g(R))−u2(R,b2,g(L))]≤ f (b2,f (R))− f (b2,f (L))
or u2(R,b2,g(R))+1≤0, which is impossible since u2(R,b2,g(R))≥0. We conclude that it is not possi-
ble to support (R,rr) with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Although Theorem 2 is quite powerful in applications, it would still be desirable to obtain general
resultsthatinvolve onlytheprimitivesof theprincipals-onlygame. In particular,we would like to ob-
7Clearly if a contract supports a SPE, it is renegotiation-proofas thereis no a1 ∈ A1 such that (1) and (2) hold.
15tain conditions for a strategy b2 ∈ A
A1
2 in the principals-only game to be supportable with incomplete
and renegotiable contracts. We call such a strategy renegotiationproof. More formally,
Deﬁnition 7 (Renegotiation Proof Strategy). A strategy b2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation proof if there exists
an f ∈C such that (f ,b2) is incentive compatible and renegotiation proof.
Wethen havethe following result, which follows easily from the deﬁnition of renegotiation proof-
ness.
Proposition 2. A strategyproﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) ofG can be supported withincomplete and renegotiablecon-
tracts if and only if (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG and b∗
2 is increasingand renegotiationproof.
In order to facilitate the statement of next results we ﬁrst introduce some deﬁnitions. For any













In other words, B(i,b∗
2) is the set of strategies that are incentive compatible and, following ai
1, give a
higher surplus to the agent and the principal than does b∗
2.
Deﬁnition 8. For any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈B(i,b∗
2) we say that m(bi





















































































The following proposition provides a necessary condition for a strategyto be renegotiation proof.
Proposition 3. A strategy b∗
2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation proof only if for any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2)
there is a blockingaction.
However, this condition is not sufﬁcient for renegotiation proofness and becomes sufﬁcient with
an additional condition on the blocking actions for different a1’s. More precisely,
Proposition 4. A strategyb∗
2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiationproof if for any i =1,...,n and bi
2 ∈B(i,b∗
2) thereis
a blocking action m(bi
2) such that i <i0, m(bi
2)>i, and m(bi0
2 )<i0 implies m(bi
2)≤m(bi0
2 ).
The conditions given in Propositions 3 and 4 coincide for the case of A1 = {a1
1,a2
1}, which we will





2) is empty. By Theorem 2, b∗
2 is renegotiation proof if and only if for any b2 ∈ B(2,b∗
2) there
exists an f ∈C such that (f ,b∗













































i.e., only if there is a blocking action, which, in this case, would have to be given by m(b1
2) = 1. Con-











1)), so that (9) and (10) are satisﬁed. Therefore, by Theorem 2, b∗
2 is rene-
gotiation proof. However, this method does not directly carry over to the general case to prove even
necessity, for which we again use a theorem of the alternative.
To apply Propositions 3 and 4 one would have to check whether there is a proper blocking action
for every possible renegotiation opportunity in B(i,b∗
2). However, we can use Proposition 4 to de-
rive a sufﬁcient condition that can be directly applied to a given strategy b2. To this end, let us ﬁrst
introduce some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 9. For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 we say that i ∈ {1,2,...,n} has right (left) deviation at b2 if there exists




1)). Otherwise, we say that i has no
right (left) deviation at b2.
Let BRj(a−j) = argmaxaj uj(aj,a−j), for j = 1,2. For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 and i ∈ {1,...,n} that has right
deviation at b2 deﬁne
R(i)={k >i :b2(ak
1)∈BR2(ak
1) and i < j <k implies that j has no left deviation at b2}.
In other words, for any action ai
1 that has a right deviation at b2, ak




is a best response, and there are no actions with left deviations in between them. Let us call such




1) and k < j <i implies that j has no right deviation at b2},
and call any member of L(i) a “left blocking action.” We are now ready to state a sufﬁcient condition
that is particularly easy to apply.
Proposition 5. b∗
2 is renegotiationproof if for any i1 (i2) that has right (left) deviation at b∗
2, R(i1)6= ;
(L(i2)6=;), and i1 <i2 implies R(i1)∩L(i2)6=;.
In other words, one needs to check if for any action a1 that has a right deviation, there is a right
blocking action, and for any that has a left deviation, there is a left blocking action. Furthermore, it
17must be checked that for any action with a right deviation and a “larger” action with a left deviation,
there is a common blocking action in between.
Although, we do not have a full characterization of renegotiation proof b2 for general principals-
onlygames, Propositions 3and4 enableusto do so in more special environments, asthenextsection
shows.
5 A Special Environment and Applications
In this section we analyze a class of games that includes many economic models, among which are
certain Stackelberg games, sequential Bertrand games with differentiated products, and ultimatum
bargaining. To deﬁne this class of games, take any principals-only game G and consider the strategic
form game S(G) = ({1,2},(A1,A2),(u1,u2)), i.e., S(G) is the simultaneous move version of G. Let bri
denoteaselection fromthebest-responsecorrespondence ofplayeri inS(G),i.e., bri(a−i)∈BRi(a−i)
for all a−i ∈ A−i.
Deﬁnition 10. u1 has positive externality in %2 if a2 %2 a0
2 implies u1(a1,a2) ≥ u1(a1,a0
2) for all a1 ∈
A1.
Deﬁnition 11. u1 is single-peaked in %1 if for all br1 ∈ BR1 and a2 ∈ A2, br1(a2) %1 a0
1 %1 a1 implies
u1(a0
1,a2) ≥ u1(a1,a2) and a1 %1 a0
1 %1 br1(a2) implies u1(a0
1,a2) ≥ u1(a1,a2). Deﬁne single-peaked
u2 in a similar manner.
Let G denote the class of principals-only games in which u1 and u2 have strictly increasing dif-
ferences in (%1,%2) and are single-peaked, and u1 has positive externality. Note that S(G) is a super-
modulargame foranyG ∈G andhence it hasasmallest andlargest (in thegiven orders)purestrategy
Nash equilibria (Topkis(1979)). Denote thesmallest Nash equilibrium by aNE andthelargest by a
NE.
Also, let ai =max%i Ai and ai =min%i Ai. The following result provides necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for an outcome to be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Proposition6. LetG ∈G. Anoutcome(a∗
1,a∗
2)ofG canbesupportedwithincompleteandrenegotiable
















In other words, in this environment only those outcomes in which player 1 plays an action that is
“greater”thanhissmallestNashequilibriumaction(inthesimultaneousmoveversionoftheprincipals-
only game) can be supported. Conversely, any outcome in which player 1’s action is greater than his
largest Nash equilibrium action can be supported, as long as player 2 best responds to that action
and condition (12) is satisﬁed. Also note that, if S(G) has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the above
proposition provides a full characterization. In many games condition (12) is trivially satisﬁed, which
implies that, in this case, an outcome can be supported if and only if player 1’s action is greater than
his Nash equilibrium action in S(G) and player 2’s action is a best response to that.
For example, consider a Stackelberggame in which ﬁrm 1 moves ﬁrst by choosing an output level
q1 ∈ Q1 and ﬁrm 2, after observing q1, chooses its own output level q2 ∈ Q2. We assume that Qi,
18i =1,2, is a ﬁnitesubset of R+ and includes 0. Let p :R2
+ →R+ be themarket inverse demandfunction
and ci : R+ → R+ be the ﬁrm i’s cost function. We assume that ci is increasing, with ci(0) = 0, p
is decreasing, and p(q1,q2) = 0, if q1 = maxQ1 or q2 = maxQ2. Proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is given by
πi(q1,q2)= p(q1,q2)qi −ci(qi) and both ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers.
Deﬁne the principals-only gameGS as follows: Let A1 =Q1 and A2 ={−q2 : q2 ∈Q2} and deﬁne%i
on Ai as ai %i a0
i ⇔ ai ≥ a0
i. Let the payoff functions be equal to the proﬁt functions, that is
u1(a1,a2)= p(a1,−a2)a1−c1(a1)
u2(a1,a2)= p(a1,−a2)(−a2)−c2(−a2)
for any (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2. This principals-only game is equivalent to the Stackelberg game deﬁned
in the previous paragraph, and u1 has positive externality. If we further assume that the payoff func-
tions are single-peaked and have strictly increasing differences, thenGS ∈G, and hence we can apply







can be supported if and only if ﬁrm 1 obtains non-negative proﬁt, its output is at least as high as its
CournotNashequilibrium output,andthefollower’s outputisabestresponsetothat. Insuchagame,
therefore, delegation may beneﬁt ﬁrm 2, even if the contracts are renegotiable.
As another example, consider an ultimatum bargaining game in which the set of possible offers
is A1 = {1,2,...,n}, for some integer n > 1, and A2 = {Y,N}. Let a1 %1 a0
1 if and only if a1 ≥ a0
1 and
Y Â2 N. Suppose that if the responder (player 2) accepts an offer a1, i.e., chooses Y , then the pro-
poser’s (player 1) payoff is n −a1 and that of the responder is a1, while if the responder rejects, i.e.,
chooses N, they both get zero payoff. This game satisﬁes all the assumptions required for Proposi-
tion 6, its simultaneous move version has a unique Nash equilibrium given by (1,Y ), and condition
(12) is trivially satisﬁed. Therefore, every offer can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable
contracts, a result ﬁrst proved by Katz (1991).
6 Strong RenegotiationProofness
One may object to our deﬁnition of renegotiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium on the basis
that off-the-equilibrium beliefs during the renegotiation process are left free. In particular, after the
equilibrium initial contract f and faced with an (off-the-equilibrium) renegotiation offer g, our def-
inition allows the principal’s beliefs to assign positive probability to any action a1. This enables us
to construct a PBE in the proof of Proposition 2 in which the initial contract f is not renegotiated as
long as (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6. A plausible way to strengthen our
deﬁnitionof renegotiationproof equilibrium isto require thatit survivestheIntuitive Criterionasde-
ﬁned by Cho and Kreps (1987). When applied to our setting this criterion requires that the principal’s
beliefs put positive probability only on actions for which it is not sub-optimal to offer g, i.e., only on
8A sufﬁcient condition for ui to satisfy strictly increasing differences is q1 >q0













1))− f (b2,f (a0
1)). This leads to
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 12 (Strong Renegotiation Proofness). We say that (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is strongly renegoti-




u2(a1,b2,g(a1))−g(b2,g(a1))>u2(a1,b2,f (a1))− f (b2,f (a1)) (13)
and
g(b2,g(a1))> f (b2,f (a1)) (14)
there exists an a0









1))− f (b2,f (a0
1)) (16)
When we work with this deﬁnition, Theorem 2 needs to be modiﬁed as follows.
Theorem 3. (f ,b2,f )∈ C × A
A1
2 is strongly renegotiation proof if and only if for any i ∈ {1,2,...,n} and
increasing b2,g ∈ A
A1


























1))}≤ f (b2,f (ak
1))− f (b2,f (ai
1)) (17)
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1)). Inthiscase, f (b2,f (ak
1))≥ g(b2,g(ak

















1))− f (b2,f (al
1)).
Therefore, in this case a renegotiation proof (f ,b2,f ) is also strongly renegotiation proof. If, however,








1)), then a renegotiation proof (f ,b2,f )
might not be strongly renegotiation proof.
Also, Proposition 2 goes through when “renegotiation proof” is replaced with “strongly renego-














1 ))} is added to the left hand
side oftheinequalities (7) and(8)in Deﬁnition 8, Propositions 3and4go throughwith “renegotiation












20when “renegotiation proof” is replaced with “strongly renegotiation proof.” 10
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we characterized outcomes that can be supported in delegation games with incomplete
and non-renegotiable as well as renegotiable contracts. We have seen that (Theorem 1) incomplete-
ness of the contracts restricts the outcomes that can be supported,in a naturalway, to those in which
the second mover’s strategy is increasing. Renegotiation imposes further constraints on these out-
comes (Theorem 2) that limit them to subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in some games. Yet,
thereisalarge classofgamesin whichnon-subgame perfectequilibrium outcomescanbesupported
even with renegotiable contracts, and hence delegation still has a bite. In particular, in an environ-
ment common to many economic models, such asthe Stackelberg and ultimatum bargaining games,
any outcome in which player 1 plays an action that is larger than his Nash equilibrium action in the
simultaneous move version of the game and player 2 plays a best response can be supported with
incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
There are several directions along which the current work can be extended in interesting ways.
The most obvious of them is to consider more general information structures and contract spaces.
One interesting possibility is to assume that the principal can observe only an outcome in some ar-
bitrary outcome space Q and that onlyQ is contractible. The model is closed by assuming that there
is a stochastic function p : A1 × A2 → Q such that p(q|a1,a2) is the probability of outcome q when
(a1,a2) is played in the game. This introduces moral hazard issues into the model and might change
our results in non-trivial ways. Another extension along similar lines would be a model in which the
agent has some payoff relevant information that is not available to the principal. This is closer to a
standard adverse selection model but is embedded in a strategic environment.11 Characterization of
renegotiation proof outcomes in either of these models is left for future work.
Throughout the analysis we assumed that the principals-only game is a ﬁnite two-stage game in
which the second mover’s set of actions A2 is the same after any choice a1 by the ﬁrst mover. This
allowed usto formulateincentive compatibility and renegotiation proofness assets of linear inequal-
ities, which were relatively easy to manipulate and apply theorems of the alternative. A more tech-
nical extension of our work would be to consider arbitrary two-player ﬁnite extensive form games.
Although, we expect similar results in such a framework, adaptingthe methods we used in the proofs
to arbitrarygames is not a trivial matter.
The results of this paper and the methods used to derive them can also be applied to contrac-
tual settings other than pure delegation, such as debt contracts, franchising agreements, etc. In such
models, the agent’s payoff depends directly on the outcome (a1,a2) in addition to the transfers be-
tween him and the principal, but we expect theanalysis of the effectsof contract incompleteness and
renegotiation to remain similar to the one presented in the current paper.














1 ))} to the deﬁnition of wbi
2
.















1 ))} is added to their left hand sides.
11As we mentioned before, Dewatripont (1988) analyzes an example of such a model and shows that contracts can have
a commitment valueeven under renegotiation.
218 Proofs
Since Γ(G) is inﬁnite (because of the contract space), we ﬁrst start with deﬁning what we mean by a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.


























u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), for all f ∈C and a1 ∈ A1 (22)
µ∗[C ](β∗
2[;])=1 (23)
In the above deﬁnition, (19) through (22) are the sequential rationality and whereas (23) is the
consistency conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1. [If] Let (b∗
1,b∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium ofG and f 0 satisfy the conditions of the
proposition. For any b2 ∈ A
A1

















2(a1), f = f ∗
∈argmaxa2u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), f 6= f ∗
for any f ∈ C and a1 ∈ A1. Consider the assessment (β∗,µ∗) of Γ(G), where β∗






















and hence condition (20) of Deﬁnition 13 is satisﬁed. Since (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium and b∗
2 =
b∗
2,f ∗, condition (21) is satisﬁed as well.
Condition (22) is satisﬁed by deﬁnition of b∗
2,f for any f 6= f ∗. To show that it is satisﬁed when
















2,f ∗(a1))− f ∗(b∗
2,f ∗(a1))=u2(a1,b∗







If, on the other hand, a2 ∉b∗
2(A1), then
u2(a1,b∗



















u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), for all f ∈C and a1 ∈ A1
Since condition (23) is also satisﬁed by deﬁnition we need only to establish condition (19) to prove











1)) = f ∗(b∗
2,f ∗(b∗






1)), thentheagent rejectsthe contractand player 2receives −∞, and
we are done again.
[Only if] Now, suppose that (b∗
1,b∗
2) can be supported. Then, there exists a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (β∗,µ∗) that induces (b∗
1,b∗
2), i.e., β∗
2[;] = f ∗,β∗
1[C ] = b∗
1,β∗
3[f ∗,a1] = b∗
2(a1) for all a1 ∈ A1.
Suppose, for contradiction, that (b∗
1,b∗





1)), for some a1 ∈ A1.





1)), for some a2 ∈ A2.
Let a0
2 ∈ argmaxa2 u2(b∗





1)), and consider the contract f 0(a2) =
u2(b∗
1,a0























by (20), which contradicts (19). Therefore, (b∗
1,b∗
2) must be a Nash equilibrium.
23We now show that f ∗ satisﬁes conditions 2 and 3 stated in Proposition 1. Suppose, for contradic-










f ∗(a2)+ε, a2 =b∗
2(b∗
1)
f ∗(a2)+2ε, a2 6=b∗
2(b∗
1)










1)) and, therefore, is



















1,a2)− f ∗(a2)−2ε, [by (22)]
=u2(b∗
1,a2)− f 0(a2),




























2(a1)), for all a1,a0
1 ∈ A1,
completing the proof.
Before we turnto theproofof Theorem 1we introduce some notation andprove asupplementary





1. Let ei be the ith standard basis row vector for Rn and deﬁne the row vector di = ei −
ei+1,i = 1,2,...,n −1. Let D be the 2(n −1)×n matrix whose row 2i −1 is di and row 2i is −di, i =











Notation 1. Given two vectors x,y ∈Rn
1. x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi, for all i =1,2,...,n;
2. x > y if and only if xi ≥ yi, for all i =1,2,...,n and x 6= y;
3. x À y if and only if xi > yi, for all i =1,2,...,n.
Similarly for ≤, <, and ¿.
For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 and f ∈C let f (b2) be the column vector with n components, where ith compo-
nent is given by f (b2(ai
1)),i =1,2,...,n.
It is well-known that if the agent’s strategy is increasing, then incentive compatibility reduces to
local incentive compatibility under increasing differences. We state it as a lemma for futurereference
and prove it for completeness.
24Lemma 1. If u2 has increasingdifferences and b2 ∈ A
A1









1)), for all i, j =1,2,...,n (24)






1 ))− f (b2(ai−1







1 ))− f (b2(ai+1
1 )), for all i =1,2,...,n−1. (26)






1)), for all i, j =1,2,...,n.
With this new notation, we need to show that
V2(i|i)≥V2(j|i), for all i, j =1,2,...,n (27)
holds if and only if
V2(i|i)≥V2(i −1|i), for all i =2,...,n, (28)
and
V2(i|i)≥V2(i +1|i), for all i =1,2,...,n−1. (29)
Also note that u2 has increasing differences if and only if
V2(l|j)−V2(k|j)≥V2(l|i)−V2(k|i), for all j ≥i and l ≥k. (30)
Clearly, (27) implies (28) and (29). Fix i ∈ {1,2,...,n} and take any j ∈ {1,2,...,n}. If j = i, then (27)
















and therefore (27) holds.
Proof of Theorem1. [Onlyif]Supposethat(b∗
1,b∗
2)canbesupportedwithincompleteandnon-renegotiable








2(a1) for all a1 ∈ A1. Given Proposition 1 we only need to prove
that b∗
2 is increasing. Fix orders (%1,%2) in which u2 has strictly increasing differences. Take any
a1,a0
1 ∈ A1 and assume, without loss of generality, that a1 %1 a0































contradicting that u2 has strictly increasing differences. Therefore, b∗
2 must be increasing.
[If] Let (b∗
1,b∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium of G such that b∗
2 is increasing and b∗
1 = ak
1, for some k =



















1)), for all i, j =1,2,...,n. (31)
By Lemma 1, (31) holds if and only if Df (b∗
2) ≤U(b∗
2). Therefore, we need to show that there exists
f (b∗






























By Gale’s theorem for linear inequalities (Mangasarian (1994), p. 33), there exists such an f (b∗
2) ∈ Rn
if and only if for any y ∈ R2n
+ , E0y = 0 implies y0V ≥ 0. It is easy to show that E0y = 0 if and only if
y1 = y2,y3 = y4,··· ,y2n−1 = y2n. Let U(b∗
2)i denote the ith row of U(b∗
2) and note that since b∗
2 is
increasing and u2 has strictly increasing differences,U(b∗
2)2i−1+U(b∗








and the proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem2. Bydeﬁnition(f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 isnotrenegotiation proofifandonlyifthereexist
i = 1,2,...,n and incentive compatible (g,b2,g) ∈ C × A
A1






1))− f (b2,f (ai
1)) and g(b2,g(a
j
1)) > f (b2,f (a
j
1)) for all j = 1,2,...,n. For any (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C ×
A
A1
2 , let f (b2,f ) ∈ Rn be a vector whose row j = 1,2,...,n is given by f (b2,f (a
j
1)). Note that incentive
compatibility of (g,b2,g) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is equivalent to Dg(b2,g) ≤U(b2,g). Therefore, (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2









1)), and g(b2,g)À f (b2,f ).
Also note that g(b2,g) À f (b2,f ) if and only if there exists an ε À 0 such that g(b2,g) = f (b2,f )+ε.
Therefore, we have the following
Lemma2. (f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 isnotrenegotiationproofifandonlyifthereexisti =1,2,...,n,b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 ,





26We ﬁrst state a theorem of the alternative, which we will use in the sequel.
Lemma3(Motzkin’s Theorem). Let A andC begivenmatrices,with A beingnon-vacuous. Theneither
1. Ax À0 andCx ≥0 has a solution x
or
2. A0y1+C0y2 =0, y1 >0, y2 ≥0 has a solution y1,y2
but not both.
Proof of Lemma 3. See Mangasarian (1994), p. 28.
Forany(f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 ,b2,g ∈ A
A1















1)))e1−ei+1. Note thatC and A depend on and are uniquely
deﬁned by (f ,b2,f ) and (i,b2,g) but we suppress this dependency for notational convenience. The
following lemma uses Motzkin’s Theorem to express renegotiation proofness as an alternative.
Lemma 4. (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is renegotiation proof if and only if for any i = 1,2,...,n and b2,g ∈ A
A1
2
there exist y ∈Rn+2 and z ∈R2(n−1) such that A0y +C0z =0, y >0, z ≥0.
Proof of Lemma 4. ByLemma2, (f ,b2,f )isnotrenegotiationproofifandonlyifthereexisti =1,2,...,n,
b2,g ∈ A
A1





ε À 0. This is true if and only if for some i and b2,g there exists an x ∈ Rn+1 such that Ax À 0 and











if and only if Ax À0. The lemma then follows from Motzkin’s Theorem.
For any (f ,b2,f )∈C × A
A1
2 , b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 , and i =1,2,...,n, letU(b2,g)j denote the j-th row of vector








U(b2,g)2j−1+αi+1− f (b2,f (ak
1))+ f (b2,f (ai




U(b2,g)2(j−1)+αi+1− f (b2,f (al
1))+ f (b2,f (ai
1)), for l =i +1,i +2,...,n,
βj =U(b2,g)2j +U(b2,g)2j−1, for j =1,2,...,n−1.
Again, note that αj and βj depend on and are uniquely deﬁned by (f ,b2,f ) and (i,b2,g) but we sup-
press this dependency. We have the following lemma.
27Lemma 5. For any (f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 , b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 , and i =1,2,...,n, there exist y ∈Rn+2 and z ∈R2(n−1)
suchthat A0y+C0z =0, y >0, and z ≥0 ifand only ifthereexist ˆ y ∈Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈R(n−1) suchthat ˆ y >0,
ˆ z ≥0, and
n+1 X
j=1
αj ˆ yj +
n−1 X
j=1
βj ˆ zj =0 (32)
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix (f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 , b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 , and i =1,2,...,n. First note that for any y and z,















−1 isthen-dimensionalvectorobtainedfrom A0y byeliminatingtheﬁrstrow. Recursively







to a row echelon form








































1))− f (b2,f (ai
1)))yk+1 =0 (38)
Therefore, A0y +C0z = 0 if and only if equations (35) through (38) hold. Now suppose that there exist






z2j, j =1,...,i −1
z2j−1, j =i,...,n−1
It is easy to verify that ˆ y >0, ˆ z ≥0, and
Pn+1
j=1 αj ˆ yj +
Pn−1
j=1 βj ˆ zj =0.
Conversely, suppose that there exist ˆ y ∈Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈R(n−1) such that ˆ y > 0, ˆ z ≥ 0, and (32) holds.
Deﬁne yj = ˆ yj for j = 1,...,n+1 and yn+2 =
Pn+1
i=1 ˆ yj. For any j = 1,...,i −1, let z2j−1 = ˆ zj +
Pj
k=1 yk+1
and z2j = ˆ zj, and for any j =i,...,n−1, let z2j−1 = ˆ zj and z2j = ˆ zj +
Pn
k=j+1yk+1. It is straightforward
to show that y >0, z ≥0, and (35) through (38) hold. This completes the proof of lemma 4.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is renegotiation proof if and only if for any i ∈
{1,2,...,n} and b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 , there exist ˆ y ∈Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈ R(n−1) such that ˆ y > 0, ˆ z ≥ 0, and equation (32)
holds. We can now complete the proof of Theorem 2.







1), but there is no k = 1,2,...,i −1 such that (4) holds and no l =
i +1,...,n such that (5) holds. This implies that αj > 0 for all j = 1,...,n +1. Since u2 has increasing
differences, βj ≥0for all j =1,...,n−1. Therefore, ˆ y >0and ˆ z ≥0imply that
Pn+1
j=1 αj ˆ yj +
Pn−1
j=1 βj ˆ zj >
0, which, by Lemma 5, contradicts that (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof.
[If] Fix arbitrary i = 1,2,...,n and increasing b2,g ∈ A
A1





Suppose ﬁrst that there exists a k ∈ {1,...,i −1} such that (4) holds. This implies that αi+1 > 0 and
αk+1 ≤0. Let ˆ yk+1 =1, ˆ yi+1 =
−αk+1
αi+1 ≥0, and all the other ˆ yj =0 and ˆ zj =0. This implies that equation
(32) holds and, by Lemma 5, that (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation proof. Suppose now that there exists an
l ∈ {i +1,...,n} such that (5) holds. Then, αi+1 > 0 and αl+1 ≤ 0. Let ˆ yl+1 = 1, ˆ yi+1 =
−αl+1
αi+1 ≥ 0 and
all the other ˆ yj = 0 and ˆ zj = 0. This, again, implies that (32) holds and that (f ,b2,f ) is renegotiation
proof.




gotiation proof. This implies that there exists f 0 ∈ C such that (f 0,b∗
2) is incentive compatible and
renegotiation proof. Let f ∗(b∗












1)). Furthermore,it can be easily checked that(f ∗,b∗
2) is incentive com-
patible and renegotiation proof. For any f 6= f ∗ and a1 ∈ A1, let b2,f (a1)∈argmaxa2u2(a1,a2)− f (a2)
and g(f ,a1) ∈argmaxg u2(a1,b2,g(a1))−g(b2,g(a1)) subject to g(b2,g(a0
1))≥ f (b2,f (a0
1)) for all a0
1.
Consider the following assessment (β∗,µ∗) of ΓR(G): β∗
2[;] = f ∗; β∗
1[C ]= b∗







g(f ,a1), if u2(a1,b2,g(f ,a1)(a1))−g(b2,g(f ,a1)(a1))>u2(a1,b2,f (a1))− f (b2,f (a1))
b2,f (a1), otherwise













y, if g(b2,g(a1))≥ f (b2,f (a1)) ∀a1
n, otherwise
for any g and f 6= f ∗; µ∗[C ](f ∗) = 1; For any g, µ[I2(f ∗,g)](b∗
1) = 1 if g(b2,g(a1)) > f ∗(b∗
2(a1)) for
all a1 and µ[I2(f ∗,g)](a0
1) = 1 if there exists a0
1 such that f ∗(b∗
2(a0
1)) ≥ g(b2,g(a0
1)); For any f 6= f ∗
and g µ[I2(f ,g)](b∗
1) = 1 if g(b2,g(a1)) ≥ f (b2,f (a1)) for all a1 and µ[I2(f ,g)](a0
1) = 1 if there exists a0
1
such that f (b2,f (a0
1)) > g(b2,g(a0
1)). It is easy to check that this assessment induces (b∗
1,b∗
2) and is a
renegotiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
[Only if] Necessity of (b∗
1,b∗
2) being a Nash equilibrium of G and b∗
2 being increasing follows from
Theorem 1. On the other hand, ΓR(G) has a renegotiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium that
induces (b∗
1,b∗
2) only if b∗
2 is renegotiation proof. Indeed, if b∗
2 is not renegotiation proof, then for any
contract f such that (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compatible, there exists an a0









1))and g(b2,g(a1))> f (b∗
2(a1))
29for all a1. This implies that, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, after history (f ,a0
1) the agent strictly
prefers to renegotiate and offer g and the principal accepts it. In other words, there exists no renego-
tiation proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium which induces (b∗
1,b∗
2).
Proof of Proposition 3. Supposethatb∗
2 isrenegotiationproofandﬁxani =1,...,n andabi
2 ∈B(i,b∗
2).




































Incentive compatibility of (f ,b∗
2) implies that Df (b∗
2) ≤ 0. Renegotiation proofness, by Theorem 2,
implies that ck f (b∗
2)≤ −wk for some k ∈ {1,...,i −1} or cl f (b∗




By Gale’s theorem of linear inequalities, this implies that x ≥ 0 and E0x = 0 implies x0Vk ≥ 0. Denote
the ﬁrst 2(n −1) elements of x by y and the last element by z. It is easy to show that E0x = 0 implies




























Increasing differences imply that −wk +
Pi−1
j=kU(b∗
2)2j−1 ≥0 and hence k is a blocking action.
Similarly, we can show that, if there exists an l ∈ {i +1,...,n} such that cl f (b∗
2) ≤ −wl, then l is a
blocking action, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We will show that there exists an f ∈ C such that (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compat-
ible and renegotiation proof. For any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) pick a blocking action m(bi
2) that
satisﬁes the conditions of the proposition. Let cbi
2 = ei −em(bi





2)|×n matrixC have row cbi
2 corresponding to each bi






























2)|×1 vector W have row wbi








Observe that if E f (b∗
2) ≤ V, then Df (b∗
2) ≤ U(b∗
2), and hence (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compatible. Fur-
thermore, E f (b∗
2) ≤ V implies W ≤ −C f (b∗
2), and, by Theorem 2, that (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation proof.
Therefore, if we can show that there exists f (b∗
2)∈Rn such that E f (b∗
2)≤V , the proof would be com-
pleted. By Gale’s theorem of linear inequalities this is equivalent to showing x ≥0 and E0x =0 implies




2)| components constitute z. Notice that for any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) there is a
corresponding element of z, which we will denote zbi
2.
Recursively adding row 1 to row 2, row 2 to row 3, and so on, we can reduce E0 to a row echelon
form and show that E0x =0 if and only if









Let J− ={j ∈{1,...,n−1}:∃bi
2 such that i ≤ j ≤m(bi
2)−1}and J+ ={j ∈{1,...,n−1}:∃bi
2 such that m(bi
2)≤
j ≤i−1}andnotethat J−∩J+ =;. Toseethis, suppose,forcontradiction,thatthereexistsa j ∈ J−∩J+.
Therefore,thereexistsabi
2 suchthati ≤ j ≤m(bi
2)−1andbi0
2 such thatm(bi0
2 )≤ j ≤i0−1. Thisimplies
that i < i0, m(bi
2)> i, m(bi0
2 )<i0, but m(bi
2)>m(bi0
2 ), contradicting the conditions of the proposition.








for j ∈ J− and

































































Increasing differences, the deﬁnition of m(bi
2), and y,z ≥ 0 imply that x0V ≥ 0, and the proof is com-
pleted.
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix an i ∈ {1,...,n} and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗











1)}. If J = ;, let
m(bi
2)=minR(i) and if J 6=;, let m(bi










































which implies that m(bi












1)}. If J =;, let m(bi
2)=maxL(i) and if J 6=;, let m(bi










































which, again, implies that m(bi
2) is a blocking action.
Finally, suppose that there exist i1 < i2 such that m(b
i1
2 ) > i1 and m(b
i2
2 ) < i2. This implies that i1
has right deviation and i2 has left deviation at b∗





2 ) and the proof is completed by applying Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. We ﬁrst prove a supplementary lemma.
Lemma 6. For any selection (br1,br2), a1 %1 a
NE
1 implies a1 %1 br1(br2(a1)) and a1 -1 aNE
1 implies
a1 -1 br1(br2(a1)).
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix a∗
1 %1 a
NE





{a1 ∈ A1 : a1 =br1(br2(a1)) for some (br1,br2)}.
Therefore, a
NE
1 %1 br1(br2(a1)) for all (br1,br2) and a1 ∈ A1. This implies that a∗
1 %1 br1(br2(a∗
1)) for




{a1 ∈ A1 : a1 =br1(br2(a1)) for some (br1,br2)}.
32Therefore, a∗
1 -1 aNE
1 implies that a∗
1 -1 br1(br2(a∗
1)) for any selection (br1,br2).
[If] Fix an a∗
1 %1 a
NE
1 and a selection (br1,br2) such that (12) is satisﬁed. Deﬁne
b2(a1)=

   
   




1 -1 a1 ≺1 a1
br2(a1), a1 = a1
Note that b2 is increasing and satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 5. Therefore, if we can show
that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium of the principals-only game G we will be done. By deﬁnition
b2(a∗
1) ∈ BR2(a∗
1). Condition (12) implies that u1(a∗
1,b2(a∗




1)) ≥ u1(a1,b2(a1)). Therefore, take any a1 such that a∗
1 ≺1 a1 ≺1 a1. By Lemma 6, a1 Â1
a∗
1 %1 br1(br2(a∗








1 ∈argmaxa1u1(a1,b2(a1)) and hence (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium ofG.
[Only if] Suppose that (a∗
1,a∗
2) ∈ A1 × A2 can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable con-
tracts. This, by Theorem 1, implies that there exists an increasing b2 ∈ A
A1
2 such that (a∗








1 . Lemma 6 implies that a∗
1 -1 br1(a∗
























where the last inequality follows from positive externality. This contradicts that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash
equilibrium ofG.
Suppose now that (12) is not satisﬁed. If there exists a0













where the ﬁrst inequality follows from positive externality. This contradicts that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash
equilibrium.
To prove that u1(a1,br2(a1)) ≤ u1(a∗
1,br2(a∗
1)) for some (br1,br2), we ﬁrst prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. If b2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiationproof, then a1 does not have right deviation.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let an
1 = a1 and suppose, for contradiction, that an
1 has right deviation, i.e., there
exists a0
2 Â2 b2(an











2, a1 = an
1
b2(a1), a1 ≺1 an
1
33Note that b0





































for all k <n, which, by Proposition 3, contradicts that b2 is renegotiation proof.
If u1(a1,br2(a1))>u1(a∗
1,br2(a∗




for all br2, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from no right deviation at a1 (Lemma 7) and positive
externality. Therefore, u1(a1,b2(a1)) > u1(a∗
1,b2(a∗
1)), which contradicts that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equi-
librium ofG, and the proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem3. By deﬁnition (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is not strongly renegotiation proof if and only
if there exist i = 1,2,...,n and incentive compatible (g,b2,g) ∈ C × A
A1






1))− f (b2,f (ai
1)), g(b2,g(ai
1)) > f (b2,f (ai
1)), and g(b2,g(a
j











1))} for all j =1,2,...,n. The following lemma easily follows.
Lemma8. (f ,b2,f )∈C ×A
A1
2 isnotrenegotiationproofifandonlyifthereexisti =1,2,...,n,b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 ,













1))} for all j =1,2,...,n.
Deﬁne the matrices V and C as in the proof of Theorem 2, and deﬁne the matrix A as follows:





1))}e1+ej+1. We have the following lemma, whose proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.
Lemma 9. (f ,b2,f ) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is strongly renegotiation proof if and only if for any i = 1,2,...,n and
b2,g ∈ A
A1
2 there exist y ∈Rn+2 and z ∈R2(n−1) such that A0y +C0z =0, y >0, z ≥0.
The rest of the proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 2, and therefore is omitted.
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